27 May 1943 proved busy for Canada's Under-Secretary of External Affairs (USSEA), something for which Norman Robertson had Lieutenant General Kenneth Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), to thank. Eager for his inactive troops to see combat, the previous day Stuart had revealed to the Cabinet War Committee (CWC) that Canada had been invited to help oust Japanese forces from the Aleutian Islands. As a native British Columbian long concerned about the Pacific conflict, and an official who favoured Canada taking a more "functional" role on the global stage, Robertson agreed assertion that an Aleutian role would improve Canadian-American relations, and balance the massive American presence in northwest Canada. But his memorandum, handed to Prime Minster William Lyon Mackenzie King, made another case for participation. Despatching troops to the Aleutians, Robertson maintained, would have a good moral and psychological effect in Australia and New Zealand and serve as a reminder "that the United States was not the only American country helping in the Pacific war", an assertion King repeated that afternoon to his ministers.
A Canadian brigade did go to the island of Kiska in the summer of 1943, an act that arguably did aid Canadian-American relations. Few Australians, though, were impressed that 5,000 Canadians fought in a theatre thousands of miles from the Antipodes when their vital strategic interests lay very much closer to home. Indeed, the notion that Canada would expect Australian gratitude for an Aleutian adventure seems odd at first glance. But this turn of events can be understood only if one is aware of 1942's unhappy events. Facing the prospect of a Japanese invasion, and led to believe by an incautious Canadian High Commissioner that Canadian assistance would be both forthcoming and substantial, Australians were angered when such aid would not provided. And although Japan did not invade, and the United States stepped into the breach, Australians did not forget that in their moment of need, Canada was absent, a simmering bitterness that prompted some Canadians to continue to advocate a visible military role in the southwest Pacific. Very little, however, was done, a reflection of the fact that vital Canadian and Australian strategic interests, despite claims of imperial solidarity, rarely coincided.
Canadian assistance to Australia was first considered, by the Australians at least, in February 1941. In September 1939 Prime Minister Robert Menzies' government had argued that Australia should not despatch forces to Britain if there was any chance of Japan's entry into the conflict. But when New Zealand promptly offered a contingent, public pressure and fear of embarrassment compelled Australia to accept British military advice and to "dovetail" its forces into those of the empire; three divisions and most of its navy went to the Middle East, two brigades to Singapore. But by November 1940, worried about Japanese intentions and British ability to fight a far east war, Menzies had begun to concentrate on home defence. An inspection of Singapore in late January 1941convinced Menzies that not all was well in Asia. Believing that Britain's far east commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, favoured a futile last stand "rather than clear-cut planning, realism and science" if war came, and that Singapore required immediate reinforcement, Menzies sought unsuccessfully to convince Prime Minister Winston Churchill to bolster that fortress.
While Menzies continued on to the Middle East, his government, profoundly disturbed by his messages home and pushed by Labor party leader John Curtin, reconsidered its options. In 1936 Curtin, casting doubts upon the wisdom of basing Australian defence policy "upon the competence, let alone the readiness, of British statesmen to send forces to our aid", had argued instead for a more self-reliant defensive posture based on army and air power. As 1941 dawned, Curtin became increasingly convinced that self-reliance was the only option. Despite ongoing attempts since mid-1940 to obtain American assurances for Australia in the event of Japanese aggression, and although one American official had remarked that an arrangement was "possible in the future", Australia's minister In Washington advised "not building any immediate hopes". Franklin Roosevelt's administration, although increasingly stretching neutrality's bounds via aid to Britain and Canada, was still reluctant to offer any solid security guarantees. On 13 February Curtin had told the Advisory War Council (AWC) that even if the United States joined the war, it likely would concentrate on Germany's defeat first, leaving Australia to "stand alone for the time being".
Australia's gaze therefore fell upon Canada, its imperial ally. Canada already had agreed to exchange bi-monthly liaison letters, but Canberra had more in mind than just this. Concerned its Singaporean and North African commitments might increase, on 12 February the War Cabinet asked its High Commissioner in London to explore whether any of Canada's inactive 60,000 troops in Britain could be despatched "down under". Although he had "no information as to the attitude of the Canadian Government", given that the Canadian troops in Britain were getting restive, Stanley Bruce had "little doubt" Ottawa "would agree that the utilisation of Canadians was the most effective and expeditious method of reinforcing the Far East".
Yet there seems to be no record of a formal request for Canadian assistance. But if Bruce or the High Commissioner in Ottawa, William Glasgow, made informal inquiries, they likely discovered the view from Canberra was very much different from that along the Ottawa River. Ties between Canada and Australia, despite the imperial connection, had never been close. The two nations had not exchanged High Commissioners until 1940, and Canadian-Australian relations had been marked by trade disputes and acrimony over the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Although Canada's representative in Canberra had sympathetically noted as early as July 1940 Australia's increasing home defence preoccupation , sympathy did not necessarily mean policy. When Canada was asked in October 1940 whether it wished to take part in a conference dealing with Anglo-American-Dutch cooperation in Asia, the response from Robertson's predecessor, O.D. Skelton, was firm; no participation and no Canadian forces in the south Pacific. Prime Minister King thought it best to send an observer, but he too opposed committing any forces to the region. Having entered the conflict with a desire of fighting a war of "limited liability", only to see that hope dashed by France's collapse, King sought always to put limits on Canada's overseas effort so as to avoid a repeat of 1917's conscription crisis that had decimated his beloved Liberal party. And while there was increasing pressure on him to put Canadian troops into action, including a December 1940 proposal to fight in North Africa, King had made it clear then that "the logical thing was to have Canadians continue to defend Britain, and not to begin to play the role of those who want Empire war".
But King's problem was that many Canadians believed they were already fighting an empire war, and one of the that view's strongest advocates, Major General Victor Odlum, was set to fill the High Commissioner's post in Canberra courtesy of King. "Bugger" Odlum, as he had been named by his men in the Second Canadian Infantry Division in Britain (and not affectionately either), despite a distinguished (and much-wounded) Great War record, was a political general in the second global conflagration. Age 60 when appointed to divisional command in 1940, Odlum was little respected by his fellow officers, and only after much complaining, and a failed attempt to promote him so that he could be returned to Canada out of harm's way , the Prime Minister on 19 October 1941 offered Odlum Canberra. Knowing full well the vociferous Odlum would not accept easily losing his combat position, and aware that Australians felt some bitterness concerning continued Canadian army inactivity while Australian troops were fighting and dying in Egypt , a silver-tongued King told Odlum he possessed "qualifications which would make it particularly fortunate for all parts of the British Empire" and his acceptance of the switch:
Odlum wasted no time in making King regret his action. Stopping in Cairo in mid-December, Odlum sought out General Sir Thomas Blamey, Australia's senior Middle East officer, to get his opinion on Odlum's suggestion that Canada should put a force into Australia. Describing the notion as a "sound military plan" and "a hammer stroke for Empire solidarity", Odlum claimed that Blamey thought the proposal "sound" and even "brilliant". Hoping that King would "give this idea your most sympathetic consideration", Odlum promised to contact him again, possibly with "new angles", once he had reached Australia.
Blamey likely was impressed for Australia was anything but self-reliant in December 1941. It had 270,000 troops at home, but most were poorly-armed and under-trained militia. The Royal Australian Air Force had just 373 mostly obsolete aircraft, while the navy mustered just three cruisers and two destroyers in home waters. Unhappy with an 8 December risk assessment that seemed to classify "this new and nearby threat to Australia [as] merely another incident in the present war", the government ordered the Chiefs to take another stab at it. The new report, delivered three days later (and one day after the Royal Navy lost the Prince of Wales and the Repulse near Malaya), anticipated that Japan would first attempt to capture vital islands between Australia and the United States, and if successful in Malaya and Singapore, might move on to "a direct move on Australia via the islands in the north and north-east".
Certainly if such an attack came, Australia would need help, but from where? The mother country was the obvious choice. There were more than 100,000 imperial troops and over 300 aircraft in Malaya, plus thousands more in India and the Middle East. Moreover, twice in 1940, first in August and then the following December, Churchill had promised that if Australia were to be seriously threatened by Japan, Britain would cuts its Mediterranean losses and "proceed to your aid sacrificing every interest except only defence position of this island [Britain] on which all depends". But in the Australians did not receive the answer they hoped for in December 1941. Cabling on the 11th that they doubted "there was any immediate large-scale threat" to Australia until after Japan had consolidated its position in the far east, "which would take a considerable period", the British Chiefs of Staff concluded by saying that "We must not forget that Germany...is still the main enemy".
Curtin, Prime Minister since October, wasted little time in opting for another more controversial approach. On 11 December the United States said that some 2,400 air corps troops and 90 aircraft, originally meant for the Philippines, would be diverted to Brisbane. Two days later Curtin, commenting "that our military resources are insufficient to meet the commitments for the defence of the Pacific Islands in which you and we are vitally interested", privately appealed to American President Franklin Roosevelt for assistance "to deny these areas to the enemy". And when that and a 23 December appeal to Roosevelt and Churchill went unheeded, Curtin, declaring in a Melbourne Herald article his refusal "to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict," added that Australia, "without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom". Menzies, who had no great love for Churchill (he had eyes for Churchill's job), termed Curtin's call "a great blunder", while Churchill, saying it was time to "take a firm stand against this misbehaviour", threatened to intervene in Australia's domestic affairs with speeches of his own. Although Curtin would explain in 1944 that he had not implied any reduction in loyalty to Britain, historians debate whether Curtin was sincere, frustrated, panicked, or deliberately attempting to embarrass Churchill and to alter Allied strategy opinion.
But regardless of Curtin's state of mind, news on 29 December that "the United States Pacific Fleet, on which we had based great hopes is unable or unwilling to assist", and Churchill's 9 January telegram which stated that Australia's defence "rests primarily with you", could not have improved his mood. And then Odlum arrived, bearing news of imminent assistance from the northern dominion. Invited to the AWC meeting on 12 January, just three days after Curtin had been advised it might be time to bring home the three Middle East divisions , Odlum claimed that he "had been instructed to discuss with the Australian Government the most appropriate form that Canadian aid might take". Adding that the possibilities included a "Canadian force...if the Australian Government so desired", Odlum boldly declared that as it "was contrary to the policy of the Canadian Government to send small dispersed detachments abroad", a division likely could be made available. Greatly pleased, Curtin immediately arranged for Odlum to confer with the Australian Chiefs of Staff on 13 January.
Odlum had no such instructions from King. Indeed, two days after arriving in Canberra, when Odlum had wired King to say that that Australia faced a real emergency and that a a Canadian force for Australia had been raised, King's response (which arrived after the AWC meeting) was blunt; only the CWC was "competent to determine the disposition of Canadian Forces". Moreover, King ended the cable with a none too subtle warning "that Cabinet is zealous in guarding its prerogative of deciding all questions of war policy including disposition of man-power and allied problems". Making matters worse, while he told King on 17 January that "[n]othing has been promised but goodwill and sympathy based on common interest in the Pacific and knowledge of the existing threat", Odlum was quoted in the 15 January New York Times as saying that "Canada's interest in the defense of Australia was the primary reason for the despatching of two Canadian divisions [sic] to Hong Kong. She can do more if Australia wants. Australia only has to say the word".
Odlum had mislead the Australians and King. Why? J.L. Granatstein states that the general had demonstrated a "remarkable lack of judgement". True, but R.G. Haycock is very much closer to the mark with his observation that Odlum "was more imbued with the myth of Empire than the realities of coalition war" and that the general had said " far too much about things of which he knew too little". But Kim Richard Nossal hits the bulls-eye full on. Having studied Odlum's performance as the ambassador to China from 1943 to 1946, Nossal describes Odlum as a man prone to ignoring discrepant information, inclined towards wishful thinking, able to reinterpret information so as to fit pre-existing attitudes and beliefs, desirous of changing the minds of others, and craving social support. Indeed, Nossal cites a 1944 despatch in which Odlum admitted that he had "learned to see things, not as they are, but as they ought to be, or, rather, as my fancy would like them to be".
And wishful thinking and social support seemed high on Odlum's personal agenda in January 1942. Intensely disappointed by his removal from command and expecting "to die of slow motion, internal explosion or spontaneous combustion" in Canberra's "placid atmosphere, Odlum peppered King with plaintive transfer requests. But while that campaign continued, Odlum sought to renovate Canada's reputation down under, the dominion being viewed by much of the Australian press as Britain's "pet", a "spoiled child doing just as England wishes". Moreover, the general had to refute accusations of Canadian military's idleness in Britain as well as charges that he "was just 'another brass hat from Whitehall' filled with the English point of view". No doubt unfamiliar with such bitter criticism, and eager to do something especially if it altered his unhappy status, Odlum told the Australians what they hoped to hear. He told the Chiefs of Staff "[t]hat if it could be shown that there was a real need for Canadian troops in the Australia area, Canada might be able to find some force for service in Australia". The Chiefs promptly recommended acquiring key equipment (including airplanes, armoured vehicles, and anti-aircraft guns), fully manned naval vessels, and a Canadian army force to act as a general reserve, a recommendation accepted by both the War Cabinet and the AWC on 20 January.
Odlum's awful mistake would be made worse by King. Counselled by External Affairs on 18 January to ensure Odlum had grasped the full implications of King's earlier warning, the Prime Minister, after hearing of the New York Times' piece, cabled Odlum two days later to gently remind that only the CWC could authorize despatching forces to Australia. However, King left the door open by remarking that while the threat to Canada was "only less immediate than that to Australia and cannot be overlooked in deciding upon [the] most effective disposition of available forces", "[c]onsideration will be given to suggestions contained in your telegrams" pending further instructions that "every care must be taken not to raise expectations which might prove impossible to fulfil". Furthermore, after meeting with King on 17 January, Glasgow reported that Canada was "favourably disposed towards rendering assistance wherever possible in the Pacific area" as long as the request came from Field Marshall Wavell, head of the American-British-Dutch-Australian command.
That King's government was seen as favourably disposed to sending troops would have greatly surprised its most influential members. When the topic was first raised in the CWC on 14 January (in King's absence), the assembled minsters, still reeling from the loss of nearly 2,000 Canadians at Hong Kong on Christmas Day and considering a referendum for April in which Canadians would be asked to authorize the government to overturn its 1940 promise not to use conscripts overseas , were anything but sympathetic. C.G. Power, the Minister for National Defence for Air, his son missing at Hong Kong, stating such matters were not Odlum's concern, added aid for Australia "was, to say the least, premature". Fourteen days later, the three defence ministers revealed that not one of their services favoured assisting Canberra along the lines suggested by the Australian military (transmitted by Odlum on 24 January), either because equipment was in short supply or as lead defence minister, J.L. Ralston, put it (at Stuart's instigation) because it "would be unwise" for Canada to take independent action given the recent establishment of Anglo-American command machinery to direct the Allied war effort. Advising that only six minesweepers and trained air crew might be available, the CWC ruled that the matter be placed before the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, so informing Odlum on 29 January.
Did Glasgow misunderstand King? There is no certain answer, but given that King's message to Odlum about meeting Australia's needs "was cloaked in the typical pall of Mackenzie King's ambiguous language - a language with which Mr. Curtin's government had precious little experience" , King may have repeated this less than categorical refusal to Glasgow. Moreover, when opposition leader R.B. Hanson stood in Parliament on 26 January to say that Canada should put a division in Australia, King, was reported in the Australian press as announcing that Canada would stand by Australia and "give her every possible help in men and machines in the present crisis". Yet that phrase is not found in the official Hansard transcript of King's remarks. Instead, King (who frequently edited Hansard), while refusing to make clear what form aid might take, is quoted as saying that Canada was anxious "to cooperate in every possible way in affording such assistance as can be effectively given", and that the Australians "may be receiving some assistance of the kind from Canada at present, and that we shall be able to add considerable assistance to them in those particulars, and possibly in other ways, as time goes on". Responding to the quote in Australian newspapers, Curtin cabled Ottawa on 28 January that "nothing would please us better than to have the active co-operation of Canadian forces in the Pacific theatre of war which is so vital to all British countries as well as ourselves".
It certainly would have pleased Curtin to receive Canadian assistance, as an appreciation prepared by the Australian military on 29 January clearly demonstrated. Just days before an Australian battalion had been lost on Rabaul, while Japanese forces were advancing through Malaya to Singapore and its large garrison (including about 20,000 Australians). Noting that Australia had to protect itself plus the islands to the north (some 3.171 million square miles) with but seven "not completely trained or equipped" divisions (and just 80 tanks), and 460 aircraft (only 181 of which were first line), the Chiefs made clear that if Malaya fell, it was "clearly beyond our capacity to meet any attack of the weight that the Japanese could launch either on the mainland or in the islands". In these circumstances, any additional force "must increase our security and provide a greater deterrent against attack', but the Chiefs suggested Canada might provide anti-submarine ships, and unspecified army and air force units to relieve Australian garrisons in the islands and to act as a general reserve.
Certainly Canberra was not relying on Canada alone to come to its aid. Curtin had already asked Churchill on 25 January for 250 fighter planes while continuing to demand the return of the divisions from the Middle East. Additionally, American forces continued to arrive in Australia in dribs and drabs, but most were not combat troops and Roosevelt had told Australia's minister in Washington that "he had very little anxiety for the security of Australia itself..." Facing seeming Anglo-American indifference over Australia's fate, King's apparent willingness to provide assistance loomed very large indeed, which made the CWC's ruling very difficult to accept when it arrived before the Australian Chiefs on 3 February. Obviously surprised and disappointed, their (non)recommendation to the AWC was simple; Australia did not need air crews. Unable itself to decide what to do, the AWC kicked the matter up to the War Cabinet. There, H.V. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, said that he had asked Odlum to transmit the 29 January appreciation to Ottawa, and with that, and after noting Odlum's offer to serve "in a part-time capacity" in the Australian forces, the War Cabinet decided to "await the reply of the Canadian Government".
Odlum sent the appreciation to Ottawa on 5 February, followed two days later by a handwritten letter to King. Declaring that he had just read the Prime Minister's 21 January message, Odlum, his ability to reinterpret information to fit his pre-existing beliefs intact, "[r]eading between the lines" judged "that the Canadian armed force is likely to come to Australia within the near future". Announcing his presence in Australia would be "a waste of public funds" if no troops were sent, Odlum sought to convince King that only Canadian soldiers would fit the bill: British forces, given the current political climate, could not be sent "for everything they would do would be wrong"; Indian soldiers "would neither be welcomed nor willing to come in view of Australia's 'White' policy; and "the American contribution would not be of much value for some time to come". The following week, intend in driving home the message that Australia's moment of crisis had arrived. Odlum intimated that the Australian government might have to move to avoid capture, and indicated his willingness to fight with the Australian military "in any active capacity". Noting on the 12th that "[u]ntil some force as I have been urging is supplied from Canada or elsewhere, I see serious possibilities ahead", on the 14th he pronounced that if a "secure" Canada made any announcement of help coming it "would have an electric effect here".
King, though, was sure Canada's moment of crisis had come. Although the initial Canadian military reaction to Japan's offensive had been to emphasize that the new situation should not alter Canada's commitment to Germany's defeat and that temporary weakness on the west coast "must be accepted under the present circumstances" , warnings in February of possible Japanese attacks on North America rattled the Prime Minister. Worried that Japan might "make some landing on our coast", and concerned that the army's European plans were excessive, King saw an opportunity in paying attention to a potential Japanese threat to Canada in:
General Stuart had other ideas. Determined to build a formidable fighting force for use against Germany, his 19 February assessment said Japan likely would not divert its attention from the vital southwest Pacific towards North America, and that Canadian defensive measures were adequate to deal with the anticipated scale of enemy raids. Unimpressed, and supported by Robertson and others in External Affairs (although not all) , King went on the attack. Making it clear to Stuart that he could not accept the army's home defence position, King forced the general's surrender by March. Telling other officers that his job was in jeopardy if he did not act, Stuart authorized the formation of two additional home defence divisions.
Preoccupied by this internal debate, the CWC was not inclined to give Australia's problems. Initially ruling on 12 February that "[n]o action by the Canadian government was called for at present", the CWC reconsidered upon receiving Odlum's 14 February cable. Although the consensus remained that this was a problem for the Combined Chiefs to resolve, Ralston indicated that it might be possible to despatch a brigade. So despite naval minister Angus Macdonald's most emphatic opposition to sending a token naval force to the south Pacific, the ministers agreed with Power's suggestion that it would be helpful to get the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff (COS) regarding the placement of soldiers in Australia. In the interim, Canada agreed to let six Catalina flying boats be given to Australia from its allocation.
Stuart, in the midst of his losing battle over home defence, and intent on scuttling another proposal to garrison the Falkland Islands , had little time for aid to Australia. When the COS met on 25 February, "being of the opinion that any assistance to Australia is impracticable in view of other commitments and other needs", they instructed their Joint Planning Sub-Committee to prepare a report "supporting this position". Its report, signed off by the COS on 3 March, did what was asked of it. Beginning with the assertion that Canada's basic commitments included the direct defence of the nation, participation overseas in the general war effort, and maintaining supply lines to Britain, the report argued that the deteriorating situation in the north Atlantic and the increased threat to the west coast mitigated against any substantial aid to Australia. Six minesweepers could be made available (if Britain approved), but providing air crew and soldiers was possible only at the expense the overseas army program and home defence. However, the military again noted that the matter rested ultimately with the Combined Chiefs.
Satisfied, the CWC noted the military's conclusions when it convened on 5 March, and two weeks later, at Robertson's urging (he thought it extraordinary that a Canadian diplomatic representative was seeking military employment with another country), it told Odlum to stick to his duties. But the matter was not resolved from Canberra's point of view. Singapore had fallen on 15 February, and nearly 17,000 Australian soldiers had marched into Japanese captivity. Two days later Curtin put the nation on a total war footing, the War Cabinet authorized to "take immediate steps for the total mobilisation of all resources...in order that the defence of Australia may be provided for". Two days after that, Japanese planes struck Darwin on the northern coast; 243 Australians were killed, the settlement badly damaged, and the air base blasted "off the face of the earth".
The result, as historian D. M. Horner states, was an air of panic hanging over the government, Curtin, and some segments of the population. Noting that Japan was "now at liberty to attempt an invasion of Australia should [it] so desire", the Chiefs of Staff ruled on 27 February that they "would require a minimum of 25 divisions to defend Australia against the scale of attack that is possible", ten of which would have to come from Australia's allies. Claiming there was "inadequate treatment in this appreciation of strategic responsibilities", the AWC ordered the military to take another look. That appreciation, ready 5 March, predicted Japan would be ready to attack Port Moresby (New Guinea) by the middle of March, Darwin and New Caledonia in April, and Australia's heavily populated east coast in May.
How Australia would meet this challenge?. The Middle East divisions were not expected home until late March, but even then there would still be the 10-division shortfall. Curtin and army minister Forde hoped that the Americans would provide 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers, especially after the deputy American commander in Australia told Washington on 4 March that "[t]he entire situation in the south Pacific had reached the stage where successful defence of Australia itself was questionable..." Some 80,000 Americans were in Australia by March, and Roosevelt planned to have over 100,000 in Australia and New Zealand soon, but most were army and air force service personnel, not combat soldiers. Moreover, there were indications that Canberra's pleas were not taken at face value. Roosevelt had told Curtin on 20 February, notwithstanding the speed at which the Japanese were moving, that Australia's "vital centers" were not in immediate danger". But Curtin would have been most upset if he had known that the US army's chief planner, Brigadier-General Dwight D. Eisenhower, had stated on 28 February that while retaining Australia and stopping Japanese expansion in the southeast Pacific was "highly desirable", they were "not immediately vital to the successful outcome of the war".
Desperate to overcome this reluctance to give aid on the desired scale, foreign minister Evatt set out for Washington and Ottawa in March. A judge until entering politics in 1940, Evatt was somewhat of an unknown quality for Canadians. Odlum's predecessor, C.J. Burchell, had reported in 1940 that Evatt was regarded as an able but "quite insincere man" willing to sacrifice anything and anybody to satisfy his own ambition", an opinion that was widely held in Australia and elsewhere. And while Odlum admired the man, and told King in mid-March that Evatt wished to meet with the Canadian Prime Minister "so that Canadian-Australian views, though divergent, may be harmonized", Glasgow told Robertson that Evatt "had been rather violent over the telephone, complaining that Canada was not rallying to Australia's aid in the present crisis in the way that Australia had a right to expect". Noting that various groups wished to meet the Australian, but fearing a "mischievous speech", Robertson hoped that if Evatt met with Canadian ministers first, he would at least understand Canada's "position before he goes on the air".
Robertson had good reason to fear what Evatt might do, for it was becoming obvious that many people did not understand Ottawa's position, and some were complaining. First, the Sydney Daily Telegraph alleged in mid-March that Canada was discriminating against Australia in the allocation of exports, a charge External Affairs denied. Then a week later Howard Green, a Conservative Member of Parliament from Vancouver and a caustic critic of King's military policy, arguing that "it would be very much better to fight Japan in Australia rather than Vancouver", rose in the House to demand that Canada send at least a token force to its sister dominion. King's response, beyond blaming Odlum "for speaking on his own" when he promised aid to Curtin, was to say that Canadian "troops should serve where and in whatever way they can do the most good to the common cause ..., it did not appear to be in the interests of the combined war effort that Canada should undertake at this time the sending of an expeditionary force to Australia".
Most importantly, Evatt's arrival in Washington in late March added to the pressure on Canada. The Australian minister, who would later admit that he thought his country "had one month to live" , was determined to convince Roosevelt that Australia required a steady flow of men and material, including 2,584 aircraft (there were only 646 currently available), that General Douglas MacArthur should be appointed the southwest Pacific theatre commander, and that a council, responsible for directing the war in the region, be immediately established in Washington. Nor would Canada be excluded; planning to come to Ottawa in early April, on 24 March Evatt handed Glasgow a letter requesting Canadian troops and equipment, including an armoured division.
This initiative had little initial success in Ottawa. When the CWC discussed the matter on 26 March, Ralston pointed out that the ministers had agreed the matter properly belonged in the laps of the Combined Chiefs. Five days later, C.D. Howe, the powerful Minister of Munitions and Supply, made very clear that Australia's equipment demands could not be met without affecting existing allocations to Britain and the United States. If Australia persisted in desiring a larger portion of Canada's production, then Canberra should approach the Allied Munitions Assignment Board.
But just hours before Howe delivered this rebuff, events in Washington were giving Evatt hope that Canada's position was becoming untenable. The morning of 1 April witnessed the first meeting of the Pacific War Council (PWC), a body composed of all of the nations fighting Japan. Established by Roosevelt in response to Australia's demand for a regional war-directing body, the PWC's official purpose was to furnish "a formal forum on the ministerial level, in which the smaller countries could express their views and recommendations", a purpose it never made good on. Canada's representative at the meeting, External Affairs officer Hume Wrong, was surprised to discover that Roosevelt's opening remarks centred on Canada. Noting that he had invited Canada to join the PWC "because he thought Canada might do more than she was now doing", the President went on to say that "we will look to Canada for assistance in securing Alaska and the Aleutians". At a loss to explain why his nation had been singled out, Wrong thought Roosevelt had not intended to focus only on Canada, but Wrong did admit that the President had not suggested "that any other country but Canada should do more in the Pacific area".
Wrong was mistaken. Roosevelt had singled out Canada, at least according to State Department official John Hickerson. Roosevelt, Hickerson told Major General Maurice Pope, the CWC's Washington representative in, had spoken as he had "solely with the (political) object of playing up Canada's part in the Council vis-a-vis the members from 'down under'". Moreover, the Canadians should have seen it coming. Assistant Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had told Leighton McCarthy, Canada's Minister in Washington, on 26 March that Roosevelt was concerned about Australia's poor relations with Britain and that the President had mentioned Australia's inability to understand why Canada "was continuing in present circumstances to send troops to England instead of despatching them to Australia".
Evatt, however, very pleased to see Canada singled out, intended to meet with King on 7 April, his main object being "to get some contribution to Australia on the lines suggested by Odlum and to review the munitions allocations". King was ready. Believing that Evatt's letter had disclosed "a sort of inferior complex, an over-sensitiveness and touchiness", the Prime Minister went out of his way to welcome his Australian guest. He met Evatt at the Ottawa train station on 8 April, and to his "complete surprise", took to him immediately, describing the Australian as "sincere and a fine type of man". During a meeting of the CWC, where Evatt made his case for aid, King, who had outlined just how extensive Canada's commitments already were and had gone so far as to say that people on the west coast "would become panicky" if troops went down under, confessed to feeling "tremendous sympathy for Evatt and his point of view". Even Howe, when personally presented with Evatt's equipment wish list (thousands of machine guns and mortars, hundreds of artillery anti-aircraft pieces, and radar kits), relented somewhat. Although there was currently no free Canadian production capacity, saying he would like to help, Howe pointed out that Canada could fill the orders within two months if diversions were made from British and American orders.
Sympathy, however, did not mean substantial aid. When the CWC reconvened the next day (without Evatt), King , while acknowledging Evatt's position and the great "moral value" Canadian assistance might have, suggested sending only a small radar unit to Australia. Perhaps more moved by Evatt's eloquence, Ralston said that the army program was not so inflexible that a larger formation, perhaps a brigade group, might be to the south Pacific. Unable to decide, the ministers referred the matter again to their military advisers. Their response was quick and consistent. Because Canada's defence plans were based upon estimates set by the Combined Chiefs and their Canadian counterparts, and because Canada's defences had not yet reached that standard, they did "not consider that Canada should divert any of her home defence resources".
Evatt, though, thought that he had made progress. Wiring Curtin on 14 April from Washington, he said that King would support an Australian initiative to alter alliance munitions allocations and that Canada "was now prepared to make more direct contribution to Australia in the form of certain equipment other than aircraft". Yet that same day, when Evatt heard a rumour that Howe's offer of aid (clearly Evatt's recollection of his meeting with Howe was different than Howe's) was to be withdrawn, he asked King to intervene to "save [the] situation both general and particular". But when King attended the PWC meeting on 15 April, King's support for changes in munitions allocations was half-hearted at best. The Canadian leader said membership on the Munitions Assignment Board was desirable "but that we would not wish this representation on the score of being there to protect the interests of any particular part of the Empire". As for Australia, Evatt had to listen while King, expressing sympathy for Canberra's position, gave a lengthy account of Canadian commitments and domestic political problems which "had made it increasingly difficult for us to comply with requests from Australia".
Well pleased with his effort, King felt certain that Roosevelt's 1 April comments had been made "not in a way which indicated any reflection upon Canada, but rather as pointing out the great need of this particular area [Alaska] receiving immediate consideration". Less pleased, Evatt told Curtin that he doubted Canada would get on the Munitions Board, and that he would likely have to talk to Churchill first before he would get any weapons from the Canadians. More shocks were coming. Still in Washington, Evatt finally received a definitive answer from King on 28 April, the day after the plebiscite. Although a majority of Canadians voted to free the government from its promise, 73 per cent of Quebecers, the bedrock of King's political support, had said no. It seems hardly coincidental that King, facing this split over the nature of Canada's overseas commitment, made his decision about Australia the very next day. Apologizing for being unable to "work out some form of direct and immediate assistance", King said that Canadian shortages made diversions to Australia impossible. Once Canadian membership on the Munitions Assignment Board was acquired, the Prime Minister promised to do "everything that can be done to strengthen the defences" of Australia and New Zealand.
It was King's hope, that given Evatt's cooperative attitude, "that the Australian authorities could be trusted to deprecate criticism of the amount of Canadian aid". And for a time it seemed that King's desire would be granted. Evatt's response, coming on 17 May, expressed appreciation for King's kind message and a desire that the "munition matter" be finalized. Even after the battle of Coral Sea in early May, which saw the American and Japanese navies fight to a costly draw near Australia, matters seemed under control. Desperate to leave Australia, Odlum wired King on 18 May to say that he intended, with Australian military encouragement, to fly to Ottawa so that he could discuss a number of "delicate matters I do not know how to put on paper". Promptly told to remain in place for fear his return to Canada "would be construed as a special appeal for aid and in view of inability of Canada to make a contribution of either men or material to Australia defence would almost certainly have embarrassing consequences", Odlum reassured King that "[n]either the Government nor Senior Command had in mind pressing direct assistance from Canada. That phase is past".
But that phase was not past, especially for Odlum. Convinced it was in Canada's postwar interests to have a good relationship with Australia, a relationship he felt had been marred by trade irritants prior to 1939 , Odlum contacted both General Douglas Macarthur (Allied commander in the southwest Pacific) and Blamey (recently returned to Australia) about the political desirability of having even a token Canadian force operating with the Americans in Australia. According to Odlum, both generals, taking a long term view, believed that "a Canadian division would be more valuable than would an American". The CWC's response on 19 August was succinct; it reaffirmed its decision that "no Canadian troops could be spared for this purpose".
Odlum, though, did get one of his wishes. Recalled to Ottawa in September for consultations, he returned not to Canberra but to a new posting as Canada's ambassador to China. Evatt, however, was still very much in Canberra, and his feelings for Canada, masked for some time, were beginning to poke through. In August 1942 Canada gave one billion dollars to Britain to finance purchases of Canadian goods. Although the money was intended for all nations in the sterling area, the Canadians found that the Australians "were unenthusiastic about the British channel, which they suspected would operate against their best interests". And when Canada proved reluctant to negotiate the matter with Canberra, acting High Commissioner E.B. Rogers quickly discovered Evatt's less genial side on 13 October 1942. In a "a short but stormy interview", Evatt, "in a very bad temper", told Rogers that Canada "was tied to Mr. Churchill's apron strings", referred "to Canadians in general and the Canadian Government in particular on most offensive terms", and complained about Canada's "empty gestures to Australia". Moreover, at a reception later that day, Evatt "sarcastically" denounced Canada in front of much of the diplomatic community and spoke of Odlum "in very disparaging terms, saying that he (General Odlum) had offered Australia as many as ten divisions at one time or another".
Although Evatt explained the following day that "his remarks had been made jokingly" , it was quite clear to King that the damage done by refusing to aid Australia was more serious than had been thought. Intent therefore on repairing relations but without adding to Canada's burden, King appointed War Services Deputy Minister T.C. Davis to be Odlum's replacement in the knowledge that "Davis could be relied on to avoid misunderstandings of the sort that had arisen after Odlum's arrival in Canberra". Davis certainly understood the terms of his new job (taken up in December 1942), declaring he had come to Canberra "with the view that I should not directly or indirectly or by any suggestion or implication promise anything..." But Davis had his work cut out for him. Finding his nation's stock "at a rather low ebb" , he played up Canada's war effort to the Australian media. But even Davis found trouble hard to avoid. Within days of arriving, King cabled to protest a press report that Davis had said that Canada would not lay down its arms until Japan was completely crushed. Concerned such comments would encourage thoughts that Canadian troops might be on the way, King warned Davis to refrain "from any statement which might be interpreted as implying the participation of Canadian forces in action against Japan since as you know we are committed to employment of our army and bulk of air force in [the] European theatre".
Initially inclined to think that he had avoided that pitfall and that Australian anger towards Canada "has subsided", Davis soon had reason for concern. Curtin, although he uttered "not the slightest hint of complaint against Canada", used a welcoming luncheon on 15 January to say that "there was no use in their complaining that Australia had been let down for there had been and still were physical obstacles (mainly shortage of shipping) preventing despatch of assistance on a large scale". And by month's end, hearing more complaints about Canada's absence from the region, Davis asked for and received permission from King to emphasize that Canada was not a military "free agent", but an ally following the direction of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs.
Thus armed, Davis set out to do his best to improve Canada's reputation among Australia's senior leadership. Curtin seemed the most approachable, and Davis was pleased to report on 2 March that the Australian Prime Minister appreciated the reasons behind Ottawa's refusal to despatch assistance and that Curtin had "nothing in mind at the moment with regard to help to Australia but that Evatt would be in a position to discuss the matter fully when he arrived". Davis was in fact quite eager to talk to Evatt. Describing the Australian foreign minister as one of the government's "strong men" and likely to be "a leading factor in the life of this country over many years to come", Davis judged it critical that Evatt's impressions of Canada "be broken down".
Davis did not get the chance to talk to Evatt before the latter left on yet another lengthy overseas trip on 1 April. At various social gatherings, according to Davis, Evatt limited their contact to handshakes and greetings, although Davis could report from second-hand sources that the Australian was not shy about expounding upon his poor opinion of King and Canada. Regardless, Evatt was not the only official Davis had to break down. Despite his earlier comments, Curtin too harboured unhappy feelings about Canada. Responding to a letter from Odlum criticizing Canada's Pacific effort, Curtin told the general on 19 March that it was "difficult to educate one country to accept the view that it would probably make a greater contribution to the defeat of the common enemy if it took some further risk itself and detached some additional Forces to aid a partner in a distant theatre". Perhaps sensing this, in late March Davis asked Norman Robertson to consider allocating some air force squadrons to Australia both for the immediate moral effect as well as Canada's future status in the region. The Under-Secretary, possibly wondering if Odlum had taken new form, told Davis that it was "not desirable" at present to consider the suggestion. If there was to be any offensive Canadian air action that year in the Pacific, it would "have to be confined to Alaska".
Robertson was correct. Canadian action in the Pacific in 1943 would be confined to Alaska, but as noted above, the Under-Secretary did believe that the despatch of troops to the Aleutians would have a measurable and good effect upon the Australians. Certainly Davis thought so too, for three weeks before Robertson advocated taking part in Aleutian operations, Davis had written him to say that news of Canadian airmen operating in Alaska "will be most helpful" in Australia". But would the Australians think so?
Despite their obvious preoccupation with the south Pacific war, Australians were well aware of events further north. One Australian military study of the Aleutians conducted in late 1941 had noted, as would the Japanese when they planned their 1942 Midway offensive, "that a force proceeding from Northern Asia against the Hawaiians would leave the Aleutians on its left and rear". Moreover, once Japan occupied the western Aleutians in June 1942, the AWC was told that Japan had done so to cut communications between the United States and the Soviet Union, no small strategic aim. But as the Australians tracked the Aleutian campaign's progress, largely through the meetings of the Pacific War Council, it became clear to them that the war there was not particularly important. As early as 18 June 1942, Roosevelt had remarked that the Japanese in the Aleutians could not do much to affect the United States. What proved far more disturbing to Canberra's denizens was Roosevelt's July 1942 claim that public pressure to act in the Aleutians was interfering with his plans to "attack the Japanese in the islands north of Australia..."
Still, once American forces landed on Attu in May 1943, the stiff fight there received substantial coverage in Australian newspapers, and Canadian air force participation in the region was mentioned. And news that Canada intended to commit 5,000 troops, mostly home defence conscripts, to Kiska's recapture in August was not necessarily something Australia would oppose. Indeed, Glasgow had said in early July that the maintenance of a substantial Canadian home reserve was "not undesirable" if that reserve could "be more readily transferred to the Pacific theatre". But Canadian hopes that Kiska would be seen as an important role were downgraded when Roosevelt told the PWC that the operation was necessary, "if for no other reason", on psychological grounds.
Evatt's return to Ottawa in mid-July thus offered an opportunity to see just what official Australian thinking on Canada was. Prospects appeared surprisingly good. On 14 July, the day before his arrival, one of Evatt's aides called Robertson with a suggestion. If Canada praised Australia's war effort and "the value such opportunities for personal contact between Commonwealth statesmen as Dr. Evatt's visit to Ottawa provided", Evatt in turn would let the Canadian press "know how tremendously Australia has been impressed by the Canadian war effort, both at home and overseas". Evatt was as good as his word. During meetings with King and the CWC about Australia's inclusion in Canada's Mutual Aid program, the foreign minister thanked Canada for supporting his country and expressed the hope that genuine consultation between Ottawa and Canberra would be possible in the postwar world. Before the press Evatt mentioned the presence of Canadian soldiers in Sicily, praised the essential "but less spectacular" Canadian war production effort, and declared that "Australia's relationship with Canada must be closer". However, when asked if he was satisfied with the amount of supplies Canada had provided since his 1942 visit and if Australia would welcome Canadian troops once Germany was defeated, Evatt emphasized instead "the desperate plight of Australia in 1941". As to the second question, Canadian forces "would be welcomed even now" with Evatt adding the prediction that "Canadians would be in action in the Pacific long before Hitler is beaten".
Although Hume Wrong thought that the real reason for Evatt' visit lay not with Mutual Aid but "was to enable him to say that he had been to Canada and to get some Canadian material for public quotation during the election campaign" , official Ottawa was relieved not to have not been publicly damned. Furthermore, the fact that Canadian soldiers were finally seeing combat in Sicily had engendered favourable comment in the Australian press , comment King hoped would continue once the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade splashed ashore on Kiska on 15 August. Unfortunately for King, Japan had abandoned the Aleutian island two weeks before the Allied landing. This "fiasco" and "ridiculous anti-climax" in the words of Canada's foremost official military historian , sorely disappointed King. Having risked some considerable political capital in using conscripts for the first time in a combat operation, King was determined to salvage something useful from the mess. Going on national radio on 21 August to play up his government having acted in the Pacific. Australia too received prominent mention, with King pointedly commenting that "[j]ust as the control achieved by the United States, Australian and New Zealand forces in New Guinea, the Solomons and elsewhere in the Southwest Pacific is aiding in the defence of Canada, so the control of the Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific by United States and Canadian forces will aid in the defence of Australia and New Zealand".
The response was definitely mixed. Not surprisingly, Australian press accounts focussed on the lack of fighting, but they mentioned too that Kiska's recapture had opened a northern route of attack against Japan itself and acknowledged Canada's part in the venture without reference to King's message. Official reaction was even less enthusiastic. One intelligence report, while admitting that the "Allied threat had moved a step nearer to the heart of things", doubted it marked an immediate danger to Japan. And when Davis met with Blamey on 25 August, the Australian general's "very first words...were that he regretted the Canadian troops were not in this theatre of war - not so much because of the actual need for them in their military operations - but as a gesture which would enhance the prestige of Canada in Australia and make for better feeling between Australia and Canada".
Certainly better feelings were anything but present over the next few months. Unhappy with its minor influence upon Allied strategy-making, and deciding on 1 October to concentrate the nation's military effort in the Pacific even "at the expense of commitments in other theatres", the Australian War Cabinet deemed it "imperative that this view should be accepted by the United Kingdom and the other Dominions, especially New Zealand and Canada". But Canberra's position received little sympathy in London or Ottawa. Much more interested in Germany's defeat, Churchill not only resisted Australia's policy, but attempted as well to limit any British contribution to the Pacific conflict. Ottawa was not much impressed either. External Affairs' reaction to a 14 October Evatt speech that laid out Australia's foreign policy goals was generally good as much of Evatt's plan, with its emphasis on international cooperation, "might very well form the basis of a Canadian policy". However, Canada, while it would seek to make its "influence felt through Commonwealth channels", was not committed like Australia "to the policy of seeking joint Commonwealth action [emphasis in original]".
Nor did Canberra find Canada very cooperative on a strictly bilateral issue. By December 1943 Mutual Aid discussions verged on collapse over an article concerning freer trade between Australia and Canada and the reduction of Australian tariffs in the postwar period. Although the matter was resolved by the following February, during the negotiations Evatt made very clear to Davis that Canada was trying to drive a "hard bargain" with another dominion, especially after "Canada had done little enough to help Australia which was bearing the brunt of the Pacific war..."
And certainly King's inclination was to allow Australia to retain that burden. Meeting with Power on 5 January 1944 to discuss a Canadian contribution to the final campaign against Japan, King, despite believing that Canada had an "obligation", felt Canadians would "get little credit for anything we do, either on the part of the U.S. or Great Britain". Nor did he think that most of his compatriots, barring British Columbians, would "be enthusiastic about going on with the war against Japan". While Power was eager for the air force to fight in the Pacific (as part of his plan to repatriate Canadian aircrew serving in the Royal Air Force), both he and the Prime Minister "agreed that there really was no place for sending any army over the Pacific", a decision ratified by the CWC two days later.
Others disagreed. Only days after he was given permission to begin forming the brigade that would land on Kiska, General Stuart had ordered his staff to study the possibility of sending a brigade group or a division to fight in Asia or the southwest Pacific. Unfortunately for Stuart and his Pacific coast commander, Major General George Pearkes, their rather clumsy efforts to gain Canadian participation in an American-led invasion of the Kurile Islands in 1944, had foundered in October 1943 upon the rocks of prime ministerial anger. But that was not the end of it. External Affairs and the navy had their own reasons for wanting action in the Pacific. Concerned about the scale, intensity and permanence of the American presence in northwest Canada, Hugh Keenleyside had suggested that Canada should take part in additional operations in the north Pacific both to balance that American presence as well as to gain Canada a voice in the regional postwar settlement. The navy, on the other hand, desirous of building a postwar blue water fleet and cooperating with the Royal Navy in the south Pacific, was pushing an ambitious program to acquire cruisers, Tribal destroyers and even aircraft carriers.
Determined to insure he remained in control, and angered by a 24 January 1944 speech by Lord Halifax that called for a common imperial foreign policy, King ensured that an aide memoire sent to Britain in February made few bones about where Canada stood. The dominion's commitment to the Pacific conflict would be determined by Canada's place as a Pacific nation, Commonwealth membership, a desire to beat Japan, and "her close and common interest with the United States". Most importantly, the document advised that a number of factors including "the importance which the northwestern route to Asia, across Canada, may assume in the later stages of the war", might "render it advisable for Canada to play her part in the Japanese war in very close cooperation with the United States, at any rate in certain operational areas".
This Canadian reluctance to act with imperial forces in the south Pacific proved disappointing again to Canberra. Canada, after all, had cooperated in the summer of 1943 with the Lethbridge Mission, a British-led study investigating the most effective way to prosecute the war with Japan. As that mission was putting particular emphasis on jungle warfare, the Canadians took another look at a September 1942 Australian army proposal about the possibility of having a Canadian observer attached to the southwest Pacific command to act as an "'interpreter'" between American and British Empire thought . Acting on Pope's May 1943 recommendation that if Canada one day found it opportune to fight in the southwest Pacific, despatching observers to serve with the Australian and New Zealand forces in the Pacific would be a good idea as it would give the Canadian army valuable experience and soothe injured Australian feelings, the army did sent the first group of observers, 20 in total, inl February 1944 but half were attached to American units.
But the Australians wanted far more than just observers as the head of the British army mission in Australia reported in December 1943. "Australians from the Prime Minister down", Major General R.H. Dewing said, "want to see British troops in this area" . And as King discovered when the dominion leaders converged on London the following Mays, Curtin was thinking not just of immediate concerns. Addressing the collected first ministers on 15 May, Curtin pushed for improved imperial consultative machinery and military cooperation in the defence of the southwest Pacific now and for the future. Unimpressed, King refused to commit himself to any imperial centralization initiatives, and noting that Canada, and Britain too, had not finalized plans for the Pacific, declined to approve a statement that all were agreed on the future conduct of the war with Germany and Japan.
The Australians, however, were not ready to throw in the towel. Curtin, with Blamey in tow, arrived in Ottawa on 30 May for more consultations. But Curtin said very little about Canada or its war effort (to King's irritation) before the CWC and Parliament, preferring to speak mostly about Australia and its close call in 1942. And when asked directly at a press conference about whether he was satisfied with the results of the London parley, Curtin, according to the correspondent for the Sydney Morning Herald, "looked at Mr. King and said that the only man in that state of mind was the man 'who sat on the right hand of the almighty'". Blamey too spent most of his time outlining Australia's views of the strategic situation, but perhaps following up Canada's April 1994 decision to send a small radar unit to Australia, ended with an solicitation for Canadian officers (operational or scientific) to visit Australian, American or even British forces in the south Pacific.
If that invitation had been a sly means of encouraging Canadian troops to serve in that region, Blamey was soon disappointed. The Canadian army was not interested. Even Pope, soon to be appointed (August 1944) the CWC's special military assistant with responsibility for framing Canada's Pacific war policy, was opposed to letting Canadian soldiers serve in the south Pacific. Saying that option struck him "as being quite fantastic", although possible if "sanctioned by the political authorities", Pope told the officer selected to devise the army's Pacific plans that given American prewar concerns about Canada's reluctance to defend itself, the dominion would be best served by operating with American forces in the north Pacific. That officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Jenkins, agreed. Fearing a hostile American reaction if Canada's effort against Japan was deemed proportionally inadequate, and opposed to working with the British because their areas of operation were tropical and jungle warfare was too rare a skill among Canadians, Jenkins thought Canada could send a division to fight with the Americans in China or Japan.
Unable to decide, the CWC had appointed a special committee, composed of the COS, Robertson and CWC Secretary A.D.P. Heeney, to examine the problem. Although Stuart (now the head of Canada's military headquarters in London), thought that "it might be logical to send a Canadian force to serve with the British in South East Asia" after Germany was crushed, and the air force and navy preferred serving with British formations given their common weapons and doctrine , the committee concluded that as the British "were apparently committed to no particular long-term strategy for the assault upon Japan", Canadian and Commonwealth interests "might be better served if the Canadian contribution to the war against Japan were made in an 'American' theatre, namely the North or West Pacific". Affirming this recommendation on 14 June, the CWC informed the Dominions Office that if north Pacific operations became feasible, Canada likely would wish to have its major military contribution made in that region.
Certainly the British were quite disappointed with this ruling, and attempted to have it reversed well into August 1945. Dissatisfaction in Canberra was quite tangible too. Interviewed by a Canadian official upon his return home, Curtin admitted to admiration for Canada's economic effort, confessed to regarding King "with considerable awe", but said nothing about military matters, an omission Davis intended to rectify. But the High Commissioner received an unpleasant and unexpected answer. Meeting some Canadian parliamentarians on 9 July, Curtin responded to a question about whether a Canadian expeditionary force should be sent to Australia with the comment that "I don't care what Canada does. We had a (Canadian) High Commissioner here who wanted to help us. He went home and never came back".
Spurred into action, the High Commission sought some sort of signal from Ottawa that might alter Curtin's viewpoint. Colonel Cosgrave, Canada's military attach� in Canberra, asked the American commander in Australia to ask for the despatch of three Canadian air force squadrons. Enthusiastically received by the Americans, the request was not well-received in Ottawa. Hume Wrong described Cosgrave's initiative as an "unfortunate" misunderstanding prompted by the attach�'s "exuberance", Robertson adding that the attach� had spoken "out of turn". But Power's attitude was quite different. Having failed the previous March to send an air force squadron, scheduled for disbandment, to Australia, the air minister was willing to despatch Cosgrave's three squadrons as there were available formations with the drawing down of home defence forces. But if the units were to operate with the Americans, that would mean the acquisition of American aircraft at a cost of just over $35 million for the initial capital outlay plus the first year of operation. Opposed, Howe advised releasing the surplus personnel rather than moving them down under, but King, who thought a "token force" might be desirable, took refuge behind the fact that a decision was impossible until Canada's part in the Pacific conflict was chosen.
Ensconced in Canberra, Davis hoped that Canada's part would in some way involve Australia. Writing directly to King on 9 August, the High Commissioner thought that Canada's relationship with Australia, and indeed with the Pacific region as a whole, called for some Canadian military contribution in the south Pacific even if the north Pacific was more appropriate for "geographical and other reasons". Noting that Britain was now considering basing four divisions in Australia, Davis thought that Canadian troops currently fighting in Italy, supplemented too by Canadian ships, might compose part of that body. Despatching forces to India and Burma might also be a possibility, but Davis warned that "regardless of what Canada does there, you will have a hard time in the future to convince Australians that we had much to do with the war in this area unless Canadian forces are actively based on this continent".
This lobbying had no effect. Confronted by ministers who favoured operating with imperial forces in southeast Asia, King told the CWC on 31 August "that it would be inappropriate and undesirable for Canadian forces to participate in the southern theatre of operations". But when the CWC reconvened in Quebec City on 13 September (the Quebec Conference was set to start the next day), naval minster Angus Macdonald, ridiculing the notion that Canadians could not fight south of the Equator, argued that "the enemy must be fought wherever he was, regardless of geography". Convinced the navy was in bed with the British, and sharing an American opinion that British plans for a campaign in southeast Asia were but sideshows to salvage imperial prestige, King, threatening to resign if Canada sent troops to the south Pacific, carried the day and convinced his ministers to agree only to action in the central and north Pacific. King's victory was complete when Churchill, rather than pushing for a large contribution for an imperial force, agreed that Canada's part need not be large, adding that he did not think it "appropriate or necessary to have Canadians serving in the tropical or semi-tropical areas of Southeast Asia".
The Australians were not surprised. One Australian officer who had visited Ottawa in early August had recounted that his Canadian counterparts, doubting that any of their military would go to the Pacific, thought that if forces were sent, that would happen only after Germany's defeat and by that point the only active theatre likely would be China. And although Australia was not formally represented at Quebec, Australian agents in North America had a good idea about what had transpired there. Lieutenant General John Lavarack, head of the Australian Military Mission in Washington, was certain that Canada had stipulated that its forces should not be employed south of the Equator, while Glasgow, who had set himself the task of determining the prospects of Canadian activity in the Pacific, was concerned that Canadians were not at all "prepared for the sacrifices which the Canadian government may call on them to make". Blaming this on King's inability to utter anything more than vague general statements, Glasgow feared that once Germany was defeated, a war-weary Canadian military might need months of rest, refitting and retraining before it could be made ready to fight in the Pacific. Seeing it as Australia's "responsibility to ensure that the Canadian people do not forget Hong Kong and that their desire for revenge is maintained", Glasgow recommended a three-pronged program of attack: lobbying the Canadian government to turn its vague promises into action; feeding Ottawa military intelligence information and training memoranda "designed to 'sell' the idea of a Pacific War to the Canadian Staff"; and adding a press attach� to the High Commission in Ottawa tasked with the job of getting the Australian point of view out to the Canadian public.
It is unclear whether Glasgow actually sent these recommendations back to Canberra, or if they were acted upon if he did. Cosgrave did report that over the next few months that he was the continual recipient of questions from Australia, American and Dutch officers about whether Canada would soon be in a position to help in the south Pacific, and citing postwar economic advantages to be gained from better relations with Canberra, he pushed for the posting of more observers to Australian units. Little was done, even after Germany surrendered on 8 May. By that point Canada had committed an all-volunteer infantry division to the planned invasions of Japan in 1945-46, and was not all interested in commitments elsewhere. Indeed, the Australians too had proved reluctant to aid Britain, attaching only a token force to the imperial contingent set to participate in those invasions; Australia's major contribution would be made with the Americans.
Davis did make one last effort. Noting in May that the Australian House of Representatives had discussed whether disparaging comments about Canada made by a Sydney newspaper editor had been prompted by the Australian government , Davis wrote King on 4 June to warn that with the end of the European conflict, Australians, noticing Canada's plans for rapid demobilization, were "bound to feel that we are not doing our share in the Pacific" unless Canada made a concerted effort to fully inform them of the facts. Assuming that any forces sent to the Pacific would not be based in Australia, Davis recommended publicizing heavily the despatch of units to other theatres, playing up Mutual Aid, attaching public relations officials to his office, and suggested visits by leading cabinet ministers (including King), high ranking officers, and prominent Canadian scientists. Japan's offer of surrender in mid-August rendered any reply meaningless.
So ends an unhappy chapter in Australian-Canadian relations. Two questions remain: why did it happen?; and did the episode have lasting consequences in the relationship? In the first case, one might be tempted to ascribe the entire problem to what American General George C. Marshall described as "localitis"; the unfortunate tendency of local and isolated commanders to exaggerate their responsibilities and burdens at the expense of the bigger picture. Certainly, Australian historians John Robertson and Glyn Harper are on record as having saying the Australian government exaggerated the threat facing them in early 1942, Harper alleging that the "error" was deliberate. Henry P. Frei disagrees. Not only does his study of Japanese sources reveal that Japan was considering very seriously an invasion of Australia (at least until its disastrous loss at Midway), but he asserts that just three Japanese divisions launched against northern Australia in January/February 1942 could have wreaked considerable mayhem.
Regardless of the merits of either case (and this author tends towards Frei's case), it is clear that the Australian government was in a fragile state in 1942. Having accepted imperial direction in 1939, Canberra discovered that Britain's not so surprising emphasis on the defence of the Middle East and the home country itself left it in a tough spot as Japan swept southward. That Australia accepted an imperial strategy that was at odds with its own security needs, David Day puts firmly at the feet of "the persistence of Australia's colonial mentality". But once stripped of the protection they had counted on, the Australians, America's Minister in Canberra reported on 20 January 1942, were "in a state of funk and yelling for help, now, from the United States while they cast blame on the British for failures in the past, some of which they share the responsibility for".
That Canada was dragged into the fray can be blamed squarely on Victor Odlum. The Australians may have sought Canadian assistance anyway, but Odlum's "rather frightening...assurance and confidence in his own judgement" made the problem very much worse. Canada's official foreign policy historian, recalling the general's April 1942 comment to Robertson that "you'll never make a real diplomat out of me while the war is on, so don't try too seriously", opines that Odlum "was not the best spokesman, therefore, for a country disinclined to commit forces to the war in the Pacific". This is an understatement of some magnitude. Driven by his own personality and suffering from a pronounced case of localitis, Odlum "went native" in Australia, and then made the problem worse by telling his Australian hosts and King differing accounts of what he had promised. Odlum was the worst possible spokesman for Canada.
King too must share much of the burden of blame. After all, he sent Odlum, a prominent Liberal, to Canberra, ostensibly as a reward, but more likely to get him out the way. And once Odlum was there, King did very little to censure the High Commissioner for his antics; in fact he rewarded Odlum with the ambassador's post to China. But beyond this, King's major fault lay with his handling of matters once Odlum had done his damage. Preferring not to offend, King fell back on his traditional practice of making statements so convoluted and ambiguous that both proponents and advocates of aid to Australia were assured that their wishes would be met. This was exactly the wrong way to deal with Australians like Curtin and Evatt. Products of a political culture that valued plain and blunt speaking, the Australian leaders were desperate in 1942 and thus willing to grasp at straws.
Reasons of personality aside, there were systemic problems too. The Canadian refusal to give Canberra a categorical answer until too late was duplicated in the same period as Canada dealt with, and rejected, a British request to reinforce the Falklands, which might lead one to argue that Canada's decision-making process, scarred by the catastrophe at Hong Kong and burdened with King's obsession about conscription, was verging on collapse in 1942. Furthermore, after the United States detected Japan's approaching Midway offensive in May 1942, requests for Canadian aircraft for Alaska too went unsupported until high-level American officials, citing signed agreements, compelled the Canadian authorities to deliver the needed aid. Fortunately for Canada, the threat at home was far less severe than that faced by Australia, but still Ottawa felt obliged to add two more home defence divisions and to evacuate Japanese-Canadians from the west coast. Perhaps Malcolm Macdonald, Britain's High Commissioner to Canada, was wrong when he averred that "'Canadians - who naturally were not so exposed to the temptation to 'panic' about Japan - remained much steadier" than the Australians.
Canadian historian R.G. Haycock argues that much of the unpleasantness during the war might have been the product of confusion brought about by the rapid expansion of the diplomatic corps in both countries. There is much truth in that. Canada and Australia were little acquainted with each other, but the problem may go deeper. Even if the two nations had established formal diplomatic relations sooner, the fact remains that they had widely divergent strategic interests. Stuck next door to the colossal power of the United States, Canada was safe from major assault from every direction but the south, and that attack was both indefensible and unimaginable by World War Two. Thus insulated, physically and psychologically, from the pressures that faced an isolated Australia, Canadian leaders like King were free to focus on issues like national unity to the detriment of imperial cooperation. Colonial mentality or not, Australians were in a much more exposed position, especially once war came in the Pacific, and they soon discovered that notions of imperial defence meant little to some of their imperial partners.
Lastly, did Canada's refusal to come to Australia's aid in 1942 and beyond have a lasting effect on bilateral relations? That is a tougher question to answer. Certainly it did over the short term. When delegates converged in San Francisco in 1945 to hammer out the charter for the United Nations, Evatt, unhappy with the lack of Canadian support for his position on the great power veto in the proposed Security Council, labelled the Canadian representative "an American stooge" and "a pawn in the move to defeat the Australian case". These problems were further exacerbated when Canada resisted Australian attempts after 1945 to contain Japan with a united Commonwealth security policy, but as Greg Donaghy points out, once the Cold War began in earnest, relations improved although economic friction and public ignorance in both countries remained problems. Perhaps the words of Mackenzie Bowell sum up the matter most succinctly. Sent in to explore trade opportunities in the Australian colonies in 1893-94, Canada's trade minister anticipated few results from the journey for "[t]he parties with whom we have been estranged so long can scarcely be brought into a close relationship at a moment's notice".
Return to conference page.